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For almost two decades the prosperity of the Agricultural Sector in the 
United States has been closely associated with exports of farm products. The 
boom years of the 1970's were times of rapidly expanding U.S. agricultural 
trade. The United States' market share in world trade of many commodities 
rose substantially, as did prices and profitability on American farms. Over 
seventy percent of U.S. soybeans and nearly sixty percent of American wheat 
were destined for overseas markets. As market shares and export sales of U.S. 
farm products fell in the early 1980's, so did commodity prices and production 
profits. 
The dollar exchange rate has b~en at the center of the discussion of 
agricultural trade and farming sector prosperity (Chapter II). Many agricultural 
economists have theorized that the value of the dollar is central to agricultural 
prosperity in this country. Soon after the devaluations of the early 1970's, 
Schuh (1974) presented a widely-acclaimed analysis of American agriculture 
after World War II which drew special attention to the value of the dollar during 
this period. His analysis included a review of the usual "closed economy" 
explanation of American investment in technology which shifted supply and 
lowered domestic prices. Price supports designed to improve faltering incomes 
among farmers resulted in commodity surpluses, which were controlled in part 
by land set-asides. Schuh claimed that an important omitted variable in this 
analysis is the value of the dollar. His analysis points out that the dollar was 
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over·valued relative to its market exchange rate from about the time of the 
Korean War until it was revalued in the 1970's. As a result of this over-
valuation, the advantages of the technological revolution in agricultural 
production were transferred primarily to the consumers since the exchange rate 
discouraged exports of farm products. The dollar's exchange rate helped over-
value U.S. land and labor. 
According to Schuh, U.S. products were placed in a noncompetitive 
position in world markets. Lower prices and shrinking profits provided 
additional incentives to adapt to the new technology, and innovations were 
incorporated in production practices at a faster rate than would have been 
otherwise. The cycle kept worsening the chances for farm sector prosperity. 
The revaluation and eventual floating of the dollar in the early 1970's ended this 
policy-imposed isolation of the agricultural sector and over·valuation of its 
resources relative to those in other countries. The result was a dramatic rise in 
U.S. exports, prices and farm prosperity. 
Events in the remainder of the 1970's and the 1980's have strengthened 
Schuh's claim that the exchange rate is an important factor in agricultural 
exports and farm prosperity. As the value of the dollar began its rise about 
1980, U.S. market shares of world trade began to fall along with farm prices. 
The dominant issue with regard to the exchange rate in 1988 is, with a 
significant decrease in the strength of the dollar since early 1985, will U.S. 
agricultural exports respond and prices of farm commodities rise? Properly 
specified empirical models of U.S. agricultural exports can help answer these 
questions. 
The role of exchange rates as a variable in models of agricultural exports 
has changed significantly over the last fifteen years (Chapter II). Early in the 
period agricultural trade models used the nominal exchange rate as a variable. 
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Later specifications called for an accounting of the relative importance of trade. 
As a consequence, exchange rates were trade-weighted to reflect the specific 
mix of countries to which commodities are exported. A further improvement 
occurred when the relative inflation in trading countries was taken into account 
and a real exchange rate variable used in trade models. This study attempts to 
measure the importance of yet another modification of the exchange rate. The 
modification takes into account the regime in which the exchange rate is 
determined in the importing country. 
The exchange regime refers to the market structure in which the 
exchange rate is determined. The exchange rate regime is a government policy 
variable. In this respect, it is an institutional variable. Since a government may 
fix its currency's value, or allow that value to be determined by market forces, 
the regime is a critical factor in determining how quickly developments in the 
currency markets are translated into exchange rate changes and price and 
income effects. 
Exchange rate regimes are often broken down into three categories 
depending upon the degree of control over the currency's value exercised by 
the government. Some governments peg the value of their currency to another 
currency or a composite currency value. Other countries allow the value of their 
currency to be determined by the forces of demand and supply. In between the 
two extremes are governments which allow their currency's value to fluctuate in 
a fixed range but will manage its value if the rate exceeds the imposed limits. 
In the 1980's, twenty percent of U.S. agricultural exports have gone to 
countries with pegged exchange rates, twenty-eight percent of these exports 
have gone to floating exchange regime countries and fifty-two percent have 
gone to countries with managed exchange rates. If there is significant 
explanatory power among the different exchange rate regimes, a model which 
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incorporates the regime in the exchange rate variable will be a superior 
predictor of the effects of recent exchange rate movements. Such a model will 
be able to more accurately forecast agricultural exports and indicate the timing 
of a recovery in the agricultural sector. In addition, the significant contribution of 
exchange regime to the model would indicate the possibility of governments 
affecting trade by the foreign exchange marketing policy which they choose. 
In this regard, a problem statement in the form of a question would be, 
"Do government policies with respect to foreign exchange market structure 
affect imports of U.S. grain?" In an attempt to scientifically investigate this 
problem, previous studies of agricultural trade and the exchange rate are 
reviewed in Chapter II. In Chapter Ill, the theories of exchange rate 
determination and agricultural trade are presented. In addition, a discussion of 
the possible effects of different exchange regimes on trade using deductive 
methodology is presented. This reasoning arrives at conclusions which are 
testable using inductive techniques. Chapter IV contains a theoretical model 
specified in such a way as to allow empirical testing of the deductive 
conclusions using inductive statistical inference. A formal null hypothesis and 
alternative hypothesis are presented as well. Results of the statistical inference 
are contained in Chapter V and conclusions in Chapter VI. 
CHAPTER II 
LITERATURE REVIEW 
A search of the agricultural economics literature produced no studies 
dealing specifically with the effect of different exchange rate regimes on 
agricultural trade. There has been considerable study of the effect of an 
exchange rate variable in agricultural trade models since the dollar 
devaluations of the early 1970's. This study draws heavily on the theory and 
methodology of these earlier investigations in studying exchange rate regimes 
and their possible effect on agricultural trade. As a consequence, this chapter 
will focus on the theoretical and empirical contributions concerning exchange 
rates and agricultural trade. A table containing the trade equations of the 
empirical studies reviewed here is presented at the end of the chapter. 
Shortly after the devaluation of the dollar in 1973, Schuh (1974) laid the 
major theoretical foundation for the empirical studies of trade and exchange 
rates which were to follow. Schuh's deductive analysis theorized the exchange 
rate's effect on the agricultural sector in the 1950's and 1960's. During most of 
this period Schuh argues that the dollar was over-valued. This led to 
uncompetitively high world prices for U.S. commodities, chronically low farm 
prices and depressed farm income. Policies that tried to relieve the situation 
naturally caused oversupply. Schuh maintained that the revaluation of the 
dollar in 1971-2 made U.S. farm products more competitive on world markets, 




Fletcher, Just, and Schmitz (FJS) in 1976 investigated the impact of 
exchange rates and other factors on North American wheat export demand. 
Using trade and exchange rate theory, they modeled North American wheat 
exports as a function of U.S. wheat price, foreign wheat production, importer 
affluence, the U.S. - importer exchange rate, importer population and Australian 
(a competitor's) wheat production. The use of the exchange rate as a separate 
variable in the export equation was justified on the grounds that the effect on 
export demand of a change in the exchange rate is likely different than the effect 
of a change in price alone. The former has more of an income effect, especially 
where more than the one commodity is traded between the two countries. 
The empirical model specified by FJS combined U.S. and Canadian 
exports because of the high degree of correlation between prices and other 
factors. North American exports to four distinct regions were estimated. 
Because of the simultaneity present in the theoretical export equation, two 
additional internal equations (disappearance and carryover) and an identity 
were specified. The system was then estimated using 2SLS, 3SLS, and OLS. 
Empirical findings from the study supported Schuh's claim that exchange rates 
were an important factor in agricultural trade and wheat prices. 
In the same year as the FJS work (1976), Vellianitis-Fidas (V-F) 
presented empirical results which contradicted Schuh's theory and the FJS 
findings. V-F used a multi-commodity time series model of import demand with 
the trade volume being regressed only on the U.S. dollar exchange rate. The 
results of her empirical tests indicate that the exchange rate is not a significant 
variable in explaining agricultural trade in the commodities modeled. The 
model specification with exchange rate as the only regressor has been 
criticized by later researchers. 
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Johnson, Grennes and Thursby (1977) modeled wheat trade using a 
spatial equilibrium model consisting of six endogenous trading partners and an 
exogenous rest of world (row). Policies among the trading partners were 
expressed as differences in price and included in the model. Their estimates 
showed exchange rates to be of minor consequence in determining trade flows 
compared with the influence of trade policies among the partners. 
Konandreas, Bushnell and Green (KBG) added more empirical evidence 
to the growing debate on the effects of exchange rates on agricultural trade in 
1978. KBG argued that export demand for U.S. wheat is the aggregate of 
individual countries' import demands. With this in mind, their model had wheat 
exports as a function of the importing country's wheat price, U.S. wheat price, 
world wheat price, the price of a substitute for wheat (rice) and the income in the 
importing country. In the regression equation itself, KBG exclude several price 
variables on the basis of high correlation, and they make a strong case for 
including the exogenous variables U.S. concessional exports, and last period 
exports. 
The KBG empirical model in each of five regions regresses wheat 
exports on effective U.S. price, last periods exports, U.S. concessional exports, 
importer production of wheat and importer income. There are no separate 
exchange rate regressors in their empirical model. The price and income 
variables incorporate the exchange rate, and KBG calculate elasticities for both 
prices and exchange rates concluding that exchange rates have substantial 
impacts on agricultural exports in general, and wheat in particular. 
Chambers and Just in 1979 presented an extensive review and criticism 
of theoretical specifications up to that time. They pointed out that the standard 
theoretical model used in examining the impact of exchange rates on 
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agricultural trade during the 1970's consists of a simple two-country excess 
supply-excess demand model: 
EDj = f(P2) 
ESi = g(P1) 
EDj = ESi =a, 
where ED is the excess demand in the jth importing country, ES is the excess 
supply in the ith exporting country, Q is the quantity traded, P2 is the price in the 
importing country and P1 is the price in the exporting country. In the absence of 
transportation costs and trade barri~rs, the law of one price holds: 
where e is the exchange rate. 
In expanding this theoretical model to a more general specification, 
Chambers and Just point out that under neoclassical consumer theory, excess 
demand as a function of only one price assumes that the cross price effects of 
all other goods is zero. Demand functions derived by maximizing individual 
utility functions subject to budget constraints are a function of the commodity 
price, all other prices and income. Therefore, the proper theoretical specification 
of excess demand and supply functions should be, 
EDj = f(y,Y) 
ESi = g(cr), 
where y and a are vectors of prices, and Y represents a measure of national 
income in the importing country. Even with a more general specification the law 
of one price will still hold: 
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y = cre. 
Chambers and Just emphasize two important implications for empirical 
work using the more general theoretical model. First, they cite other 
theoreticians who have made a strong case for including the exchange rate as 
a variable separate from the price regressors in trade models. This 
specification is justified on the basis of different reactions by buyers to price 
moves and exchange rate moves. The second implication for empirical work is 
a method for dealing with the prices of all other goods in the specification of the 
model. A hypothesized two stage budgeting process on the part of consumers 
allows a simplification to the price of the good in question, an index of all other 
traded goods, and an index of nontraded goods as the price regressors in the 
empirical trade model. The only model approaching such a specification is the 
one designed by Fletcher, Just and Schmitz (1976). Chambers and Just note 
that this study found exchange rates to be an important factor in agricultural 
trade flows. 
In 1981 Chambers and Just presented an elaborate empirical study 
which tested their deductive hypotheses of two years before. The dynamic 
econometric model used quarterly data from 1969 to 1977 and consisted of 
fifteen equations, three of which were identities. The recursive system was 
divided into equations which explained disappearance, inventories, exports 
and production for corn, wheat and soybeans. The data were expressed in per 
capita form and 3SLS was used to estimate the parameters. As advocated in 
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their theoretical paper, this model included a separate exchange rate regressor 
in the export equations. The exchange rate was expressed in terms of the 
International Monetary Fund's Special Drawing Rights (SDR). Additional 
independent variables in the per capita wheat export equation were own-
deflated wheat price, the EC threshold price for wheat imports, stocks of wheat 
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in exporting countries, P.L. 480 shipments, the lagged dependant variable, and 
seasonal variables. The findings of this study confirmed the significant impacts 
of exchange rates on export volumes, especially with respect to corn exports. 
Exchange rates had the least significance in the wheat export equation. 
In 1984, as a part of a paper about exchange rate behavior and 
agricultural exports, Batten and Belongia presented an extremely simple, single 
equation aggregate export model. Using quarterly data, their empirical model 
regressed the volume of U.S. agricultural exports on the trade-weighted index 
of foreign real GNP, a deflated price index of U.S. agricultural exports and the 
real trade-weighted index of the dollar. All variables were expressed in natural 
log form. The data, from 1971 to 1984, contained not only the export expansion 
years in the 1970's, but the years of declining exports in the 1980's. The most 
outstanding characteristic of this model other than its simplicity is the R2 of .94, 
which exceeds the proportional explanatory power of most previous models. 
The export elasticity of the exchange rate was estimated to be -. 71, which 
agrees with theory, but the impact on exports of the exchange rate regressor 
was significantly less than that of foreign GNP, which led Batten and Belongia to 
conclude that importer affluence is the main factor which affects agricultural 
exports, not the exchange rate. 
In 1985, Henneberry published a paper in which he raised the possibility 
of institutional constraints, specifically exchange rate regimes, having an effect 
on trade which is distinct from the price and income effects measured in 
previous models of agricultural exports. The exchange rate is the price of the 
dollar in terms of another currency. Often the dollar exchange rate is expressed 
in terms of an index of many other currencies. The exchange regime is 
particular to a country and a matter of government policy (thus, an institutional 
parameter). The regime is the market structure in which the exchange rate for 
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the domestic currency is determined. Institutional considerations determine the 
extent (or timing) to which the markets are allowed to operate in determining the , 
price of the domestic currency. Exchange regimes are grouped into three 
categories: floating, limited flexibility and pegged. Henneberry was particularly 
interested in the pegged regimes because over twenty percent of American 
agricultural exports go to countries with pegged exchange rates. Pegged 
currencies do adjust to market forces, but the adjustments are sporadic, extreme 
and usually unexpected. Agents operating in such markets face less short term 
fluctuation but greater risks of unexpected revaluation in the long run. His 
suggestion at the time was to develop an agricultural trade-weighted exchange 
rate that would take into account the high proportion of fixed exchange rates. 
In a 1987 article, Henneberry, Drabenstott, and Henneberry (HDH) 
estimated U.S. wheat trade with a single equation model which included an 
exchange rate variable. The quarterly volume of U.S. wheat exports from 1973 
to 1986 was regressed on the real trade-weighted GOP of wheat importers, the 
deflated U.S. wheat export price, the real trade-weighted exchange rate for 
wheat exports, the real price of Australian wheat, the deflated world price of rice, 
and the production of wheat in the rest of the world. In estimating the model, 
natural logs of all variables and OLS techniques were used. The estimation 
resulted in an R2 of .43, which is not high but it is similar in explaining power 
with earlier empirical results of quarterly wheat export models. The relative 
strengths of the estimated coefficients seem to confirm the findings that own 
price and importing country income factors have more influence on wheat 
exports than the exchange rate. HDH emphasize that the influence of pegged 
exchange rate regimes among U.S. wheat importers may significantly weaken 
the effect of exchange rates. 
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Another recent study by Bessler and Babula (1987) tested the relevance 
of exchange rates in export models by statistical methods rather than on a 
theoretical basis. Since there is still considerable controversy over the 
inclusion of a separate exchange rate variable, Bessler and Babula explored 
the question using various formulations of the trade-weighted exchange rate, 
wheat price, wheat export sales and wheat export shipments. The different 
formulations were used to make out-of-sample forecasts and the prediction 
error for each was measured. Sales and actual shipments were differentiated 
because of the additional lags and complications involved with shipments 
(logistics, etc.) over a relatively simple negotiated sale. Their findings with 
regard to exchange rates were that wheat sales and shipments could be 
forecast as well or even better by leaving exchange rates out of the model 
specification. 
In their 1988 empirical study, Childs and Hammig used a model with 
simultaneous equations for five commodities to test the hypothesis that the 
exchange rate is the key explanatory variable affecting the level of farm exports. 
Their partial equilibrium trade model had a separate block of recursive 
equations for each commodity. The dependent variables in each block were 
domestic price, domestic production, ending inventory, domestic consumption, 
and export volume for the commodity. Exports in the last equation were 
regressed on the real domestic price, the real trade-weighted exchange rate, 
the deflated gross domestic product of the importing countries, and in the case 
of grains, the population of livestock in the importing countries. Most variables 
were expressed in per capita figures and the time series was in annual periods. 
Some of the estimated equations had low R2 and their estimated coefficients 
had unusual signs such as positive price and negative income coefficients. 
Childs and Hammig had conclusions similar to those of Batten and Belongia, 
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finding that exchange rates matter much less than do variables representing 
importing country income. 
No studies undertaken to examine the impact of exchange rate regimes 
in models of agricultural exports were found in the agricultural economics 
literature. 
TABLE I 
TRADE EQUATIONS OF THE EMPIRICAL STUDIES 
Fletcher, Just, Schmitz. (1976) 
3 equation model of North American wheat exports, annual data: 
X= f(P, Qj/Ki, Yi/Ki, ER, Qaus/Kaus) 
Konandreas, Bushnell, Green. (1978) 
Single equation model of U.S. wheat exports, annual data: 
X = f(Xt-1, P, Xcons, Qi/Ki) 
Chambers and Just. (1981) 
5 equation model of three U.S. export commodities, quarterly data: 
X/K = f(P, ERsdr, Pee, Qrow, Xcons, X/Kt-1) 
Batten and Belongia. (1984) 
Single equation of aggregated U.S. agricultural exports, quarterly data: 
X= f(P, Yi, ER) 
Henneberry, Drabenstott and Henneberry. (1987) 
Single equation of U.S. wheat exports, quarterly data: 
X= f(P, ER, Yi, Paus, Pric, Qrow) 
Childs and Hammig. (1988) 
3 equation model of five U.S. commodities, annual data: 




Exchange Rate Behavior 
According to the theories of open economy macroeconomics, the 
exchange rate can have profound effects on trade. With prices in the U.S. and 
other countries stable or nearly so, a significant devaluation of the dollar against 
the yen would lower the foreign price of American grain by the proportional 
amount of the devaluation. This could all happen in a matter of days. During 
the same period, the dollar might surge upward with respect to the peso on 
news of economic problems in Mexico. The magnitude of this surge would be 
reflected in the peso price of U.S. commodities sold in Mexico and the demand 
for these commodities would fall accordingly. Thus, price effects underlie the 
theoretical statements of exchange rate impacts on trade, but there are different 
measures of the exchange rate and not all affect trade like the examples above. 
For this reason it is appropriate to outline the composition and behavior of 
exchange rates. 
The exchange rate (E) in this discussion will be in terms of foreign 
currency per dollar of domestic currency. Consequently, when the dollar is said 
to 'strengthen', E will increase. 
In a floating exchange regime, the exchange rate will be determined by 
market forces. Demand and supply of dollars and of the foreign currency will 
determine the value of the foreign currency per dollar at any given moment. In 
an unhindered market, ;the demand and supply of currencies is determined by 
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trade in goods and in financial investments. Demand for goods or investments 
produces a demand for the currency with which to buy them. 
Two theories have been advanced to describe exchange rate behavior. 
The older of these theories is the purchasing power parity theory (PPP). PPP 
has been shown to accurately model the exchange rate between countries in 
the long run and is based on the relationship between domestic and foreign 
price levels. Purchasing power parity expressed mathematically is, 
P* = EP (1) 
where P* is the foreign price level, E is the exchange rate in foreign currency 
per dollar, and P is domestic prices. According to PPP, over the long run E 
equates the market assets in the two economies. After dividing both sides of 
equation (1) by P* it becomes evident that, 
1 = EP/P* (2) 
So long as PPP holds, the exchange rate times the domestic price level divided 
by the foreign price level will equal one. Obviously, when there is not parity in 
price levels and the exchange rate, this relationship will not equal one. 
Equation (2) can be modified to reflect non-parity by substituting the variable Q 
for the parity value of one, 
Q = EP/P* (3) 
Q is referred to as the real exchange rate and is equal to one so long as PPP 
holds. The importance of Q is that it influences trade. (E may or may not 
influence trade: As long as the parity of equation (1) holds, changes in E do not 
influence trade). When Q falls, there is a decline in the strength of the domestic 
currency not attributable to the relative prices in each economy. Dollars 
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become less expensive for foreign importers of American grain to buy. The 
trading partner's currency costs more dollars to buy, and although the foreign 
good prices may remain constant, the goods become more expensive in 
dollars. U.S. grain's real price falls in the importing country and foreign import 
real prices rise in the U.S. Both of these effects act to shift demand toward 
domestic products. Thus, the real exchange rate (a) operates independently 
from price levels in the respective countries to produce price effects. 
Two factors operate to influence the real exchange rate (a). These 
factors are structural changes in the economy and capital market fluctuations. 
Structural changes in the economy are long term shifts relative to two partners 
! 
in things like technology, population and natural resources. Short run changes 
in a can also occur. Almost as rapidly as interest rates can change, a can 
change. This relationship is outlined in the second theory of exchange rate 
behavior, the uncovered interest parity model (UIP). Because of electronic 
capital transfers world-wide, there is a considerable arbitrage in capital markets 
of many countries. Investment capital is shifted between assets in markets 
internationally. Among other things, investors seek the highest return on their 
investment. Open economy theory assumes that interest rates represent an 
appropriate rate of return on investments. Equilibrium in the capital market can 
be expressed as, 
. .. 
I =I (4) 
where i is the domestic interest rate and i* is the foreign or world interest rate. 
According to the UIP model, a r~se in domestic interest rates above the world 
rate will invite an in-flow of investments large enough to influence the real 
exchange rate and eventually interest rates. Demand for dollars to purchase 
the higher yielding assets would bid up the dollar's value. a, the real exchange 
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rate, would rise in this case. The rise in Q, independent of the price levels in the 
two countries, will shift demand away from U.S. commodities. This shift acts to 
reduce interest rates (IS curve shifting left along LM curve). 
Modifying equation (3) by solving for E, the nominal exchange rate can 
be expressed as, 
E = QP*/P (5) 
Expressing proportional changes in all variables, (5) becomes, 
1\ 1\ 1\ 
E = Q + (P*- P) (6) 
where the " over each variable indicates proportional change. From equation 
(6) it can be seen that the market determined nominal exchange rate has both 
price and real exchange rate factors influencing it. Since the real exchange 
rate is the only variable affecting trade, Q is of interest in specifying models of 
agricultural trade. . The real exchange rate in this and other studies of 
agricultural exports is calculated according to equation (3) above. 
Trade Models 
Chambers and Just (1979) in their outline of agricultural trade theory 
point out that the usual examination of the impact of exchange rates on trade is 
based upon the standard excess supply--excess demand model. Konandreas, 
Bushnell and Green (1978) have explained that total export demand for U.S. 
commodities is the aggregate of individual country import demands. Most 
empirical work examining exchange rate effects on trade has concentrated on 
estimation of import demand (excess demand) relationships. 
Paarlberg, Webb, Morey and Sharples include a conceptualization of 
trade and policy issues in their 1984 publication. Many of the graphical 
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descriptions below draw on their work. A graphical representation of a world 
market where the U.S. is a "large country" is presented in Figure 1. This would 
be the situation when U.S. stocks are low and pricing policy is ineffective in 
supporting U.S. producer prices (world price is above the loan rate) as was the 
case in much of the 1970's. Figure 2 illustrates the world market when stocks 
are high and the loan rate supports the U.S. price, which has been the case in 
much of the 1980's. X in both cases is the quantity of U.S. trade in the 
commodity, a term of central importance (the dependant variable) in our model. 
Figure 3 and Figure 4 illustrate the U.S. domestic market from which the 
excess supply curves of Figures 1 and 2 are derived. Both Figures 3 and 4 
contain totally inelastic supply curves representing a fixed production of the 
commodity in a single production period. A shift of the supply curve in Figure 3 
from S to S' might be a result of weather patterns, government production 
controls or price in the previous period. A shift of the supply curve in Figure 4 
might result from either of these factors, or be caused by a change in the target 
price for the commodity. TP and LR are the target price and loan rate 
respectively in Figure 4. As drawn in this graph, the intersection of the long run 
supply curve (Sir) and the target price determines the quantity produced. The 
production response to TP in Figure 4 is illustrated as falling from S to S'. 
Figures 5 and 6 illustrate changes in domestic demand. The demand 
function in Figure 5 is simply an aggregate of individual demands in the U.S. 
economy. This demand is derived from consumer utility maximization subject to 
a budget constraint and is therefore a function of, among other things, the price 
of the commodity, all other prices, and the nation's income. Shifts in the 
demand curve result from changes in factors other than the commodity price. 
An increase in demand possibly resulting from an increase in the price of 
substitutes (D to D') is i,llustrated in Figure 5. In Figure 6, the negatively sloped 
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portion of the demand curve is a function of the same variables as the curve in 
Figure 5, but the totally elastic portion of this curve is a function of government 
policy, namely the U.S. loan rate to farmers. Changes in the loan rate shift this 
portion of the curve. A decrease in demand resulting from a drop in the loan 
rate is illustrated in Figure 6. 
Shifts in the domestic supply and demand functions bring about shifts in 
the excess supply curve in the world market. Excess supply is zero at the 
equilibrium price of the exporting country. Changes in the domestic equilibrium 
price will change the intercept of the excess supply function. Other things being 
equal, this will change the trade volume (X to X') for the commodity as is shown 
in Figures 7 and 8. Consequently, shifts in excess supply can be traced to 
changes in the exporter's economy which shift the domestic supply and 
demand curves. The excess supply shifts in Figures 7 and 8 correspond to the 
demand shifts in Figures 5 and 6 respectively. 
The excess demand function is the same in Figures 1, 2, 7 and 8. It can 
be thought of as the demand above the domestic price in a single importing 
country, or the aggregate of such excess demands in a group of countries (the 
rest of the world or a subset of the rest of the world). As was pointed out above, 
estimating excess demand is of central importance to many of the previous 
studies of agricultural trade. 
The internal situation in the importing country or countries is shown in 
Figure 9. As in the exporting country case (Figure 3), shifts in the supply curve 
from period to period are a function of variables such as weather, price in the 
previous period and government policy. The demand function is derived from 
the solution to consumer's utility maximization problem subject to a budget 
constraint, and is therefore a function of the commodity price, the price of all 
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other goods, and individual incomes. Importer demand shifts when these other 
prices and when income changes. 
Shifts in the importers' supply and demand functions bring about shifts in 
the excess demand curve of the world market. Changes in the domestic 
equilibrium price will change the intercept of the excess demand function. 
Other things being equal, this will change the trade volume for the commodity. 
A fall in the domestic price is illustrated in Figures 10 and 11. In both cases the 
shift in excess demand results in an equilibrium trade volume (X') which is less 
than that traded before the importing country shock occurred. 
Theory would indicate that own price increases will have a negative 
effect on the import quantity demanded of an ordinary commodity. Increases in 
the price of substitutes for the commodity, all else being equal, should shift 
demand toward the commodity. If the commodity is a normal good, an increase 
in importer income should increase demand. If the commodity is inferior, an 
increase in income will decrease demand. 
A devaluation of the dollar, which has been the case since early 1985, is 
depicted in Figure 12. The price in the world market is in U.S. dollars. A 
depreciation of the dollar will allow each unit of the importer's currency to buy 
more dollars and therefore more U.S. commodity. The greater the price, the 
greater the devaluation's impact on foreign currency buying power, thus the 
rotation of importer excess demand. In Figure 12, the U.S. is assumed to be the 
' 
sole exporter. If there were competing exporters with currencies independent of 
the dollar, the excess supply curve would also rotate. The devaluation 
illustrates an increase in trade from X to X'. 
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Exchange Regimes 
The exchange rate regime of the country or countries importing U.S. 
commodities has yet to be considered in models of export demand and 
agricultural trade. When the exchange rate variable is included in a model of 
trade, the price and income effects of exchange rates are accounted for, but the 
model implicitly assumes that economic agents under different regimes act 
uniformly in their demand for a commodity. As Henneberry (1985) has pointed 
out, import buyers in countries with pegged exchange rates face less short term 
price fluctuation but greater risk of unexpected revaluation in the long run. The 
resulting market instability means that agents dealing with pegged exchange 
rates may shift demand away from imports and toward domestic production or 
domestic substitutes in order to avoid this instability. This is especially relevant 
when considering that it may be six months between the time a sale is 
negotiated and the actual payment and delivery are completed. 
A closer examination of the conditions to which import buyers are 
exposed because of exchange regime may reveal behavioral distortions. The 
examination will focu~ on the distinctions between buyers with a floating 
exchange rate and buyers whose currency is pegged. Figure 13 illustrates the 
relationship between two currencies that might occur over a certain time period. 
Two relationships are graphed, one indicating the relative market value of the 
currencies if they were allowed to 'float', and the other graph indicating the 
relationship if the importer fixed the exchange rate with respect to the exporter's 
currency. The exchange rates are shown to be equal under both regimes at 
certain times (where the lines intersect). Two substantial devaluations of the 
importer currency are also shown on the pegged graph. 
Figure 13 contains a graph of a pegged exchange rate over time when 
the importer's currency is pegged to that of the exporter. Figure 14 illustrates a 
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pegged exchange rate relationship when the peg is not to the exporter's 
currency. In this case, during the periods between devaluations, the graph 
(curving line) reflects the relationship between the exporter's currency and the 
peg currency (i.e. SDR, French Franc, etc. with respect to the dollar). The 
effects are the same as those in Figure 13 near a time of devaluation. At time t1 
in both Figures the pegged regime importer's currency is overvalued. Then 
comes a drastic devaluation where price and income effects are massive, and 
at time t2, the importer currency is undervalued. Figure 14 serves to illustrate 
that the relationships discussed below are representative of any situation where 
exchange rates are pegged, and not just the case where the importer currency 
is pegged to the dollar. 
Contrasting the price effects on imports will point to possible distortions in 
the behavior of buyers from one regime with respect to buyers from another. In 
Figure 13 the pegged import buyer is in a more favorable position at point A 
(time t1) than the buyer with a floating currency at A'. The degree of over-
valuation of the pegged currency at that point is reflected in the distance 
between A and A'. Since the pegged currency is over-valued, it will buy more of 
the exporter's currency, and consequently, more of the exporter's commodities 
for a given unit of pegged currency. This is like a price break on the 
commodities and demand would be shifted toward imports at point A. If over-
valuation is apparent to the importing country buyers, and a devaluation is 
expected, this knowledge may be an additional motivation to buy while the price 
is low. At a later time corresponding to 8 and 8', it can be seen that the pegged 
currency is under-valued when compared with the market or floating rate. At 
this time, pegged regime buyers would be discouraged from importing. At time 
t2 the price of the exporter's currency is unusually high and there are no 
bargains in imports as long as the pegged currency is under-valued. 
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The net effect of these types of pegged exchange rate distortions on 
buying behavior depends mostly on the length of these periods and the 
magnitude of over- and under-valuation. 
Another contrast between the two regimes that may have even more 
impact on the behavior of buyers, is the risk to which they are exposed, 
especially considering the nature of sales of traded commodities. International 
grain transactions are usually a matter of long-standing relationships between 
traders and trading countries, and of contracts which are negotiated months in 
advance of shipment and delivery. Although floating exchange rates do 
fluctuate, the changes are far more gradual than the revaluations of pegged 
regimes (Figure 13). A gradual adjustment in exchange rates allows for gradual 
adjustments in contractual arrangements. Abrupt adjustments mean contractual 
risk in buying and additional expense in shifting to different sources for import 
commodities. This is where an important behavioral distortion may occur. If it is 
more expensive and risky to buy foreign commodities, the importing countries 
will shift demand away from imports and toward domestic production. Such a 
shift in demand is probably the major overall effect that pegged exchange rates 
have on trade. 
These conclusions have some support in the work of previous studies. 
Juster and Wachtel in a 1972 study found that price uncertainty during periods 
of inflation, whether anticipated or unanticipated, led consumers to buy less. 
Simple price uncertainty was shown to diminish demand. Import buyers are 
consumers of traded commodities and can face extreme price uncertainty when 
revaluations periodically occur. 
Chambers and Just in their 1979 paper make an even greater case for 
sensitivity to exchange rate changes. 
... there is further reason to believe that exchange movements 
should be differentiated from market price movements. Orcutt, in a 
classic paper, has hypothesized that economic agents react more 
quickly to exchange rate fluctuations than to market price changes 
in a world characterized by fixed exchange rates (pegged). When 
exchange rates are inflexible, consumers perceive a devaluation 
or revaluation as being more permanent than short-term price 
changes. Also, in this case, exchange rate movements usually 
involve much larger percentage changes than market price 
fluctuations taking place in a similar short time interval. On the 
basis of these two points, it would not be surprising if adjustment to 
exchange rate changes in a fixed rate system was faster than to 
market price changes. 
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Chambers and Just's claim of increased sensitivity to exchange rate fluctuations 
in fixed or pegged systems, would lead to the conclusion that buyers will also 
avoid exchange rate risk to an even greater extent than simple price risk. 
If the exchange rate regime does in fact make a difference in the 
behavior of buyers of U.S. export commodities, the demand functions for a good 
should vary depending on the regime under which purchases of that good were 
made. As was pointed out above, it should make no difference to which 
medium the currency is pegged. 
If the theorized shift in demand away from imports among pegged 
exchange rate importers is significant, estimates of models which distinguish 
between regimes will be different than those which do not. In addition, 
comparisons of pegged and floating importers will reveal an insensitivity to 
those variables which normally cause import demand to increase. Price and 
exchange rate changes, for instance, can be expected to have less of an effect 
on demand for U.S. grain among pegged importers. These deductive 
conclusions or hypotheses concerning the effects of government exchange 
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Figure 5. U.S. Demand Shift 1970's 
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Figure 9. Importer Supply Shift 
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METHODOLOGY AND DATA 
The problem was stated iri Chapter I in the form of the question, Do 
government policies with respect to foreign exchange market structure affect 
imports of U.S. grains? This study uses an experimentalist or econometric 
methodology which integrates deductive theorizing with inductive testing. The 
theory justifying inclusion of an exchange regime variable in a model of U.S. 
agricultural exports was developed in Chapter Ill. The present chapter (IV) 
specifies those conclusions in a model which can be estimated empirically. The 
purpose of the model specification is to enable a testing of the theory using 
statistical inference. 
In this study, U.S. food and feed grain exports are modeled as a function 
of a deflated U.S. export price, the trade-weighted real exchange rate, a trade-
weighted income variable for the importing countries and a one period lag of 
the dependant variable. The price variable is the value of exports divided by 
the volume. This unit value is deflated by the U.S. consumer price index. In 
mathematical terms, the single equation export model is, 
Xt = f(P/CPius, RERtw, GDP/CPiim, Xt-1), or, using less complicated 
variables, 
Xt =a+ B1 Pt + B2 EAt+ B3 Yt + B4 Xt-1 + Ut (1) 
where P/CPI is the U.S. export price (unit value) divided by the U.S. consumer 
price index, REA is the trade-weighted real exchange rate index, and GDP/CPI 
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is the trade-weighted gross domestic product index over the consumer price 
index for the importing countries and Xt-1 is the previous period export volume. 
Ut is the error term. A further discussion of the selection of independent 
variables for inclusion in the model is in the Conclusions Chapter (VI). 
Trade-weighting the exchange rate and income variables involves 
combining the data from each importing country according to the proportion of 
the total exports purchased by a country. The weight for a particular country is 
its import volume divided by the total imports of all countries in that period. This 
weighting factor is multiplied times the country's exchange rate and income 
values and the product added to the weighted values from all other countries. 
Consequently, a country's contribution to the variable value in any period 
depends on its contribution to the dependent variable. A detailed discussion of 
the formulation of data for the study is contained in Appendix A. 
The one period lag of export volumes takes into consideration the 
institutional setting of trade between countries. Contractual obligations and 
negotiated agreements between trading partners may prevent buyers from 
switching to alternative sources of grain in one period. This setting is an a priori 
reason for structuring a model so that it conforms to the partial adjustment 
theory of demand behavior. Precedent has been set in this regard by the 
specifications of Konandreas, Bushnell and Green (1978) and Chambers and 
Just (1981 ). Partial adjustment theory, as outlined by Kennedy (1985), claims 
that for every set of conditions which an importer of grains faces, there is a 
desired level of grain which the buyer would import. In terms of the above 
model, for every combination of price, exchange rate, and domestic income 
there is a desired level of grain imports. When viewed from an export demand 
perspective, the combination of exogenous variables produces a desired level 
of exports of U.S. grain (X*}. According to the partial adjustment theory, if 
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inertia, imperfect information and rigidity are taken into account, the desired 
level of exports will not be the actual level for that period. This is the case 
because of buying habits on the part of importers. In addition, importers are 
never certain whether recent changes in these independent variables are 
temporary or permanent. Most importantly, contractual arrangements and trade 
agreements are not quickly or easily changed on the basis of price, exchange 
rate or income shifts. 
Partial adjustment theory claims that actual exports, or the observed X, is 
some constant proportion of the difference between the present and the desired 
export volume. The cost of rapid adjustment brings about this proportional 
behavior. Expressed mathematically, 
Xt- Xt-1 =actual adjustment, and 
X•t - Xt-1 = desired adjustment, 
where X*t is the desired level of exports considering the exogenous conditions 
in time t. If cr is the coefficient of adjustment, representing the proportion of 
change made toward ~he desired level of exports, the relationship between 
actual and desired adjustments is 
Xt- Xt-1 = cr(X•t- Xt-1). 
The desired volume of exports (X*) is not known, but cr 's value can be 
determined. According to partial adjustment theory, the export model is, 
Xt = aa + cr~1 Pt + cr~2 EAt + 0'~3 Yt + (1-cr) Xt-1 + crUt. 
Since the coefficient of the lagged dependent variable is (1-cr), cr is easily 
calculated. If the coefficient of adjustment is one, the desired level of exports is 
achieved in one observation period. Adjustment to the independent variable 
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values is instantaneous. If the coefficient of adjustment is zero, no adjustment 
toward the desired level is made. The independent variable values are ignored 
and buying behavior foquses on last period's volumes. 
The export demand model with a lagged dependent variable (Xt-1 as a 
regressor) is an autoregressive equation. Autoregressive models violate the 
stochastic regressor assumption of classical linear regression. The 
noncontemporaneous correlation between the lagged dependent variable and 
the disturbance terms results in biased coefficient estimators in an ordinary 
least squares (OLS) output. The OLS coefficients are consistent and, since 
there is little that can be done in small samples to correct the problem, they are 
normally adopted as the most appropriate estimators (Kennedy, 1985). 
Equation (1) above is referred to as the restricted model in this study. It 
does not include any variables to account for differences in exchange rate 
regimes. Exchange rate regime will be included as a qualitative variable like 
gender or season, rather than a continuous variable like price. The reason for 
including exchange rate as a qualitative or discontinuous variable is that the 
exchange regime of countries is categorized by the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) as pegged, managed or floating. If the actual degree of control over the 
exchange market were reported, then a continuous variable could be used. 
Using IMF data necessitates discontinuous values which can be included in an 
export model by using dummy variables. Since the dummy variables account 
for the exchange regime of a group of importers, their inclusion changes 
equation (1) to the unrestricted model. 
In structuring the observations for an unrestricted model, variables can 
be considered for different groups of countries depending on the exchange rate 
regime specified in those countries. Consequently, the data for any one period 
(year) were broken into three parts, one for those countries with managed 
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exchange rates, one for those countries with floating exchange rates and one 
for the countries with pegged exchange rates. In this way each year has three 
observations. This is similar to previous studies where export flows were 
broken down into several regions of the world. Here we have three groups of 
countries, each with a common regime. The Konandreas, Bushnell and Green 
(1978) model grouped countries according to region. 
In the restricted model shown above, all observations were included in 
the estimation without regard to the group to which they belong. Estimates of 
the parameter coefficients and other information such as the error sum of 
squares can be obtained using ordinary least squares (OLS). The error sum of 
squares (sum of squared residuals) for the restricted model (ESSr) is important 
to this study. The error sum of squares is used in the statistical inference. 
The actual inclusion of exchange rate regime variables completes the 
model to be estimated. The equation which accounts for changes in exports 
depending on exchange rate regime is referred to as the unrestricted model. 
Because regime is a qualitative variable, dummy variables are used to account 
for changes in regime among the regressors. The unrestricted model is 
presented in mathematical form below: 
X= a.+ B1 0 1 + B203 + B3P + B4ER +BsY + B6XL + B7P*D1 + B8P*03 
+ BgER*01 + B1 oER*03 + B11 Y*01 + B12Y*03 +B13XL *01 
+ s14XL*03 + Ut, 
where the continuous regressors are as defined in the restricted model and the 
0-variables are zero-one dummy regressors. XL is the one period lag of the 
dependant variable. 01 was one if the observation is from a group of managed 
regime countries, and zero otherwise. 02 was one if the observation is from a 
group of floating regime countries and zero otherwise. And 03 was one if the 
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observation is from a group of pegged regime countries and zero otherwise. It 
will be noted that the D2 dummy variable has been dropped from the equation, 
which is the usual practice to avoid perfect multicollinearity (the dummy variable 
trap). 
The dummy variables act to include and eliminate appropriate 
independent variables in the model depending on the exchange rate regime 
associated with that observation. The intercept as well as the slope of the 
regression function will vary with the respective regime. Slope in this 
discussion refers to changes in the dependant variable with respect to an 
individual explanatory variable, all other variables held constant. The intercept 
of the function associated with floating regime countries is a. The intercept of 
the export function associated with managed regimes is a.+B1. The intercept of 
the function associated with pegged regimes is a.+B2. The slope coefficient of 
the real exchange rate regressor for countries with floating exchange rate 
regimes is B4. The slope parameter of the ER term in the function associated 
with pegged regimes is B4+B1o. The slope parameter of the ER variable 
associated with managed regimes is B4+Bg. The slopes of the other regressors 
with respect to the different regimes are calculated in a similar manner. 
1\ 1\ 
Likewise, estimates of these parameters are calculated from the B and a. 
coefficients of the OLS output. Estimation of the unrestricted model yields an 
error sum of squares (ESSu) as the estimation of the restricted model did. 
The inclusion of a discontinuous exchange rate variable in the model of 
agricultural exports is now complete. The error sum of squares from the 
estimation of this unrestricted model will be compared with the error sum of 
squares from an estimation of the model which does not include a regime 
variable (restricted model) in calculating an F statistic. This inference procedure 
was developed by Chow (1960) and is further outlined below. If this study was 
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dealing with a continuous regime regressor, the t statistic of the estimated 
coefficient on that variable would allow an inference with a given level of 
probability as to the impact of regimes on trade. The F statistic allows the same 
type of inference to be made regarding the discontinuous variable. The 
hypotheses about the discontinuous regime variable are similar to those of a 
continuous variable as well, only an F statistic is used, and instead of the null 
hypothesis concluding the coefficient is zero, the null conclusion would be that 
there is no significant difference in the restricted and unrestricted estimations. 
Stated quantitatively, 
Ha: F>O, 
where H0 is the null hypothesis, Ha is the alternative hypothesis and F is the 
true population param~ter. If H0 is concluded, the regime should not be 
considered a part of the export model. If we fail to reject the alternative 
hypothesis, regime may be considered part of the model. Statistical inference 
permits an estimation of the risk (the probability) of being wrong in failing to 
reject the alternative hypothesis (type I error). 
The test to compare the statistical similarity between regressions was 
developed and reported by Chow in 1960. It is often referred to as the Chow 
test of structural stability, because it measures the statistical similarity between 
structural regression equations. The Chow procedure is further illuminated by 
Maddala (1977) and Ray (1988). The F* statistic is calculated by taking the 
difference between the ESSu and the ESSr, dividing this difference by the 
number of restrictions imposed by the restricted model, and dividing that 
quotient by the estimated variance of the unrestricted model (S2). The number 
of restrictions imposed by the model is the number of regressors in the 
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unrestricted model minus the number in the restricted model (which is ten in this 
case). In formula notation, 
F* _ (ESSr - ESSu)/1 0 
- S2 
Conclusions concerning the structural stability test are made by comparing F* 
with a table F value at the appropriate level of statistical significance. The F* 
statistic measures the difference in explaining power of the two models. If there 
was not a significant difference in explaining power, F* would not be 
significantly different than zero and the null hypothesis can not be rejected. 
The Chow test of structural stability can also be conducted without the 
use of the dummy variable equation described above. The observations for 
each of the regimes can be grouped and estimated separately using the same 
structural form (regressors) as the restricted model. In this method the restricted 
model is identical to equation (1) above, but the unrestricted model is the set of 
three estimations of export equations for the different regimes. The ESSu value 
is the sum of the error sum of squares from all three unrestricted estimations. 
Economic theory does not dictate the functional form that an export 
model should take, and the structural models were estimated using various 
functional forms. The functional form with the best fit (highest R2) was selected 
for the test and for parameter estimations. 
Annual data for the dependent variable and the price variable were 
gathered from the USDA's Foreign Agricultural Trade of the United States and 
Situation and Outlook Yearbooks for wheat and feeds. In addition, data for the 
trade weighted real exchange. rate and importer income variables were 
collected from the IMF's International Financial Statistics. The dependent 
variable, export volume from the U.S. to a particular importing country, includes 
both food and feed grain exports. All data were gathered by country, trade 
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weighted and then grotlped according to exchange rate regime. Appendix 1 
includes a detailed description of the data collection and aggregation from the 
above sources, as well as a table of the data sets used to run the regressions. 
CHAPTERV 
RESULTS 
Although the several variations of natural logarithmic and semi-
logarithmic functional forms were tried, they proved to be no better in predicting 
food and feed grain exports than the linear form. Consequently, the results 
reported below are based on the linear data sets given in Appendix B. 
Results of the ordinary least squares (OLS) regression of U.S. grain 
exports on U.S. grain prices, trade weighted real exchange rate, trade weighted 
importer income and the last period's exports for the restricted model are 
reported in Table II. The restricted regression uses the fifteen observations 
(1972-86) from each regime group without distinguishing as to exchange 
regime. All forty-five observations are used in estimating the restricted 
equation. 
The OLS results for individual regime groups are also reported in Table 
II. The three group equations are estimated using only the fifteen yearly 
observations for that particular group. The t* statistics given below the 
coefficient estimators in parentheses allow the comparison with table values 
which test the hypothesis that the coefficient is equal to zero. The table t values 
for the regressions are .also given. If the t* does not equal or exceed the table 
value, the null hypothesis that a coefficient is zero and the variable does not 
impact the independent variable cannot be rejected. Inspection of the four 
outputs reveals that of the theoretical explanatory variables, the exchange rate 
regressor is negative in three of the four regressions (restricted, managed and 
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TABLE II 
OLS ESTIMATES OF THE RESTRICTED 
AND REGIME GROUP EQUATIONS 
RESTRICTED 
X= 8141508- 961349 P- 14487 ER- 50578 Y + 1.0 XL 
(1.80) (-1.13) ( .. 0.63) (-1.99) (30.83) 
VALUE OF t, df = 40 
1-tail t (a=.05) = 1.68 
MANAGED REGIMES 
X= 6793307 + 441666 P- 41881 ER + 7516 Y + 0.22 XL 
(1.61) (0.54) (-1. 71) (0.18) (0.86) 
FLOATING REGIMES 





(2.99) (-1.75) (-2.09) (-1.73) (4.75) R2 = .87 
PEGGED REGIMES 
X= 11568907 + 301053 P + 8419 ER- 93235 Y + 0.16 XL 
(1.29) (0.32) (0.18) (-2.39) (0.53) 
VALUE OF t , df = 10 
1-tail t (a =.05) = 1.81 
1-tailt (a.=.10) = 1.36 
R2 = .82 
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floating) and positive but insignificant in the pegged. The importer income 
regressor is significant and negative in all but one equation. The price variable 
is significant only in the case of floating regimes. The lagged export volume is 
positive in all equations. R2 is defined as the proportion of the variation in the 
dependant variable, grain exports, explained by the regressors other than the 
intercept variable. Compared to most previous work, the R2 is very high in the 
restricted and the individual regime equations. 
Table Ill summarizes the signs of the estimated coefficients and their 
significance for the restricted equation and the equations of the three regime 
groups. An asterisk next to a plus or minus sign in Table Ill indicates that the 
variable coefficient has a significant t statistic. 
The lack of significance of the price variable and the negative sign on the 
importer income term are results that are worthy of some comment. According 
to the data used in this estimation, only in the case of floating regime countries 
does deflated U.S. price of grain significantly influence demand. Such results 
may be due in part to the structure of world markets where the U.S. is a supplier 
of last resort. Bilateral trade agreements between the U.S. and grain importers, 
and large volumes of U.S. concessional sales may also contribute to these 
results. Mixed results on price coefficient estimators is not uncommon in 
previous studies (Konandreas, Bushnell and Green, and Childs and Hammig). 
From the signs of the income coefficient estimators it appears that U.S. 
grain may be an inferior good. An increase in affluence may result in a shift 
toward animal protein and away from grains. Another explanation may be that 
a drop in national income in highly agrarian countries could be the result of crop 
failures and result in larger imports of foreign grain. In either case, U.S. grain 
imports would be an inferior good. The single equation wheat export model 
estimated by Konandre,as, Bushnell and Green (1978) also exhibited negative 
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TABLE Ill 
SIGNS AND SIGNIFICANCE OF 
ESTIMATED COEFFICIENTS 
ESTIMATED COEFFICIENT SIGN 
EQUATION p ER y XL 
Restricted * +* -
Managed Regimes + * + + -
Floating Regimes * * * +* - -
Pegged Regimes + + * + 
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and significant importer income coefficients. It should be pointed out that 
Konandreas, Bushnell and Green in their 1978 estimation reported coefficient 
inconsistencies with a priori expectations, to include the coefficient of the 
lagged dependant variable term (page 44). 
Although these equations offer some interesting insights into the 
classification of U.S. commodities and the strength of the exchange rate term, it 
is not the purpose of this study to add to the debate over the importance of the 
exchange rate variable in explaining agricultural exports. The purpose of the 
statistical analysis is to estimate the significance of exchange rate regimes in 
explaining exports. Specifically, the study tests the hypothesis that there is no 
statistically significant difference in the explanatory power of export demand 
equations when the exchange rate regime is included in the model. In order to 
compute the F* statistic needed for the test, the error sum of squares (ESS) from 
the restricted equation and the total error sum of squares from the three regime 
equations are used (Chapter IV). The total ESS of the three regime equations 
can also be found by running a regression using all forty-five observations and 
dummy variables to differentiate between regime groups, as was described in 
the last chapter. By estimating this unrestricted dummy variable model, the full 
effect of including the different regimes can be estimated, and these results 
compared with those of the restricted equation. 
The results of the OLS estimation on the unrestricted model are reported 
in Table IV. The data sets for this equation as well as those of the individual 
regime observations are given in Table VI and Table VII in Appendix B. The 
high R2 gives some indication of the magnitude of the explaining power of the 
unrestricted model when all regimes are considered together. 
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TABLE IV 
ESTIMATION OF THE UNRESTRICTED EQUATION 
UNRESTRICTED 
X= 34309803- 27516495 D1 - 22740896 D3- 3667638 P- 119603 ER 
(4.17) (-2.63) (-1.63) (-2.44) (-2.92) 
- 159897 Y + 1.03 XL + 41 09304 P*D1 + 3968691 P*D3 
(-2.42) (6.62) (2.11) (2.09) 
+ 77722 ER*D1 + 128023 ER*D3 + 167412 Y*D1 + 66663 Y*D3 
(1.40) (1.83) (1.84) (0.81) 
- 0.82 XL*D1 - 0.88 XL*D3 
(-1.94) (-2.15) 
VALUE FOR t, df = 30 
1-tail t (a=.05) = 1.70 




The conclusions of this study are based on the comparison of the 
estimated F* statistic and a table F value. An F table, with the appropriate 
numerator and denominator degrees of freedom, gives critical values for the F 
statistic. These values allow an estimate of the probability or risk of concluding 
that the true F is greater than zero when in fact it is equal to zero (type I error). 
In the case of this study, F* measures the difference in explaining power of the 
model when exchange regimes are included and when the regime variable is 
excluded from the model. According to Chow (1960), when F* is significantly 
greater than zero there is a difference, and the statistical test confirms the 
deductive conclusion about exchange regimes. Stated in terms of the 
hypothesis, if F* were greater than the critical table value, the study fails to reject 
I 
the alternative hypothesis that F is greater than zero. 
Type I error is the probability of being wrong in failing to reject the 
alternative hypothesis and is referred to in statistical tables as the a value. An 
optimal a value can be calculated using a loss function, but this study conforms 
to the customary practice of selecting an arbitrary a value. Conclusions with 
regard to the true F statistic constitute the final step in the induction process. 
Statistical inference has been used to test the theoretical conclusions of 
Chapter Ill. 
The table F value for ten and thirty degrees of freedom and an a of .05 is 
2.16. Estimation of the linear functional form produced large error sums of 
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squares in this case. The ESS for the restricted equation is 1.66 E+ 14 
(166,000,000,000,000). The ESS for the unrestricted model is 8.76 E+13. The 
calculated F* is arrived at from 
F* _ (ESSr- ESSu)/1 0 _ 2 68 
- S2 - . 
which when compared with the table value of 2.16, is significant at the .95 level 
of confidence. 
The magnitude of the calculated F* statistic leads to a failure to reject the 
alternative hypothesis, and a conclusion that there is a significant difference in 
the structural export equations when countries are grouped according to 
exchange rate regime. This confirms the theoretical inclusion of an exchange 
regime regressor in the _model of U.S. grain exports. Statistical inference allows 
the qualification that this conclusion has a 5% or less probability of being 
wrong. (There is a 5% chance that the true F is equal to zero, and therefore, 
that there is no difference in the models.) 
Given that there is a significant difference when countries are grouped 
and equations are allowed to vary on the basis of those groupings, can the 
study conclude at this point that this difference is due to exchange rate 
regimes? Might it be due to other characteristics common to the grouped 
countries? Are omitted variables causing variations in the dependant variable 
which are picked up by the dummy variables? How do the signs, magnitude 
and significance of estimated C'Jefficients align with the theory of a shift in 
demand discussed in Chapter Ill? 
Although the inference procedure has been followed and the results 
indicate a confirmation of the theory, the signs and significance of some 
coefficients reported in the previous chapter warrant a closer look at the data 
and its derivation. 
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After examination of the countries in each exchange group, the process 
of variable selection for inclusion in the basic model is reviewed in detail. 
According to Tweeten (1983), the practice of sequential experimentation with 
variables to enhance goodness of fit is a common empirical technique among 
agricultural economists, but its use is rarely reported when studies are 
published. This study reports the process. 
Next, the magnitude of regressor coefficients are compared with the 
detail of deductive logic which concluded in Chapter Ill that pegged regime 
importers are less responsive to the advantages of trade in grains. These 
additional analyses constitute a further empirical testing of the theoretical 
conclusions. 
Addressing the issue of additional common characteristics among 
regime groups, attention should be directed to Appendix A where the sampled 
importers are listed according to regime. It seems difficult to imagine any 
common characteristics other than exchange rate regime on the basis of these 
lists. One might speculate that pegged regime countries would have a high 
percentage of lesser developed countries and that developed countries would 
be common to the floati.ng regimes. This is not the case, especially in the more 
recent groupings where the pegged list includes Austria, Finland, Norway, 
Sweden, and Israel, and the floating list includes Zambia, Pakistan, the 
Philippines, Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica, the Domin'ican Republic and 
Uruguay. Common characteristics based on affluence or economic 
development are not apparent. 
The issue of omitted or misspecified variables is also a cause for 
investigation. The most basic model considered regressed grain exports on the 
price (unit value), the exchange rate and the importer income variable, 
X= f( P, ER, Y) 
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To this basic equation were added a rest-of-world ending stocks variable 
(Qrow), a one period lag of the importer income, one, two, and three period lags 
of the exchange rate and the one period lag of exports (Xt-1)· None of the 
additions improved the estimates or the consistency of the signs on the 
coefficients except for the lag of the dependant variable. When added to the 
basic equation, Xt-1 improved the restricted R2 from a .1 0 to .96. Its inclusion in 
the individual group equations improved their R2 in every case, but not to so 
great a degree as in the restricted case. Although the model may be 
misspecified to some degree, this study uses or has tried nearly all variables 
included in past empirical research. 
It seems unlikely that the model has omitted important variables. It is also 
apparent that the regime groups do not have other characteristics in common 
which would lead to significant differences in the estimated equations. If a 
comparison of the empirical results for the pegged and floating regimes 
confirms the theory of a shift in demand proposed in Chapter Ill, it would seem 
reasonable to conclude that the differences found by the Chow test were indeed 
due to exchange rate regime. 
The discussion in Chapter Ill contrasted the gradual changes 
experienced when an importer's currency is floating with the dramatic changes 
which occur when the exchange rate is pegged and periodically revalued. The 
contractual risk involved and the findings of Juster and Wachtel (1972) and 
Chambers and Just (1979) led to the conclusion that the added risk and 
expense incurred by buyers importing grains under pegged exchange rates 
would distort demand. Specifically, buyers with the additional risk and expense 
of renegotiating contracts would shift their demand away from the imported 
grain. In order to confirm this theory, a comparison of empirically estimated 
equations for pegged and floating regimes should indicate less sensitivity to 
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explanatory variables in the pegged regime estimates when compared with 
those of floating regime estimates. Variables such as price and exchange rate 
should be of lesser magnitude in explaining demand for imported grain the 
pegged equation. 
Referring to the estimated equations for the pegged and floating regime 
countries reported in Table II, the R2 s indicate that the equations are roughly 
equal in their explaining power. The coefficient of the price variable in the 
floating equation is negative and significant while the coefficient of the same 
regressor in the pegged equation is positive and insignificant. The coefficient of 
the exchange rate variable in the floating equation is negative and significant 
while the pegged coefficient is likewise positive and insignificant. The importer 
income coefficients are negative and significant in both equations but the 
coefficient in the pegged equation is smaller in absolute terms than that in the 
floating equation. The lagged export coefficient is positive and significant in the 
floating equation while this coefficient is smaller and insignificant in the pegged 
equation. The estimated coefficients in the managed regime equation fall 
between the pegged and floating regime coefficients as far as sign, magnitude 
and significance is concerned. 
The empirical results indicate. that the regressors used to specify this 
export demand model have less effect in determining demand in the pegged 
regime countries. This would indicate a shift in preference away from imported 
grain and tends to confirm the theoretical claims of Chapter Ill. More importantly 
for this chapter, the results of this comparison tend to confirm that the significant 
difference in structural equations between groups of countries in this model is 
due indeed to exchange rate regime. 
Efforts should be made to further test and possibly extend the findings of 
this study. More recent data which reflect the current turn-around in U.S. grain 
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exports may add valuable insights. Data which would re-group countries 
according to exchange regime on a yearly basis, rather than every five years, 
would tend to refine the estimations. Future models might attempt to assign a 
value to each country's exchange rate policy that reflects the degree of control 
over exchange rates exercised by the government. The discontinuous 
classifications of floating, managed and pegged would be eliminated and the 
exchange regime could be included as a continuous, quantitative variable. 
Such a specification would add a further degree of sophistication to the trade 
model. Estimating a regime variable coefficient would allow calculation 
institutional policy elasticities. 
Pegged exchange rate policies and the resulting shift away from imports 
could mean that the countries which peg their currency subsidize domestic 
production to a greater extent than do countries with more market-oriented 
exchange policies. Empirical tests of this relationship may be a fruitful area for 
further research as well. 
Shifts in demand away from import commodities by countries with 
pegged regimes should be of special interest to policy makers. Because of 
frequent revaluations of relatively large magnitude, importers which peg their 
currency burden themselves with additional risk and expense in their trade with 
other countries. In this way the pegging of a currency becomes a barrier to 
' 
trade. The costs of such an institutional framework for exchanging currencies is 
born by both trading partners. The cost to the importing country of this policy 
should be estimated and considered by governments when deciding the 
degree of market influence over foreign exchange. 
Lower commodity trade volume and world prices resulting from fixed 
exchange regimes hurts U.S. exporters and producers. If the relationships 
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theorized in this study are confirmed by further tests, exchange rate regimes 
may become an issue of U.S. negotiations designed at reducing trade barriers. 
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DETAILS OF DATA COLLECTION 
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Data on thirty-six buyers of U.S. grain were collected in the course of 
empirically testing whether exchange rate regimes have an impact on 
agricultural trade. The countries included in the test were selected on the basis 
of availability of national income and price data, as well as being purchasers of 
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United Kingdom Columbia 
Bunundi Costa Rica 
Malawi Dominican Republic 






Grouped by regime for each period the countries are: 
MANAGED (1983-86): Saudi Arabia, France, Germany, Italy. 
FLOATING (1983-86): Canada, Australia, Japan, Switzerland, United Kingdom, 
South Africa, Zambia, Korea, Pakistan, Philippines, Greece, Chile, Columbia, 
Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, Uruguay. 
PEGGED (1983-86): Austria, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Burundi, Malawi, 
Bangladesh, Malaysia, Nepal, Singapore, Thailand, Israel, Jordan, El Salvador, 
Haiti, Honduras. 
MANAGED (1978-82): France, Germany, Italy. 
FLOATING (1978-82): Austrailia, Canada, Japan, Switzerland, United Kingdom, 
South Africa, Korea, Philippines, Greece, Israel, Columbia, Uruguay, Saudi 
Arabia. 
PEGGED (1978-82): Austria, Finland, Norway, Sweden, Burundi, Malawi, 
Zambia, Bangladesh, Maylaysia, Nepal, Pakistan, Singapore, Thailand, Jordan, 
Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Haiti, Honduras, Chile. 
MANAGED (1972-77): France, Germany, Norway, Sweden. 
FLOATING (1972-77): Canada, Japan, Italy, Switzerland, United Kingdom, 
Philippines, Saudi Arabia. 
PEGGED (1972-77): Austrailia, Austria, Finland, Burundi, Malawi, South Africa, 
Zambia, Bangladesh, Korea, Malaysia, Nepal, Pakistan, Singapore, Thailand, 
Greece, Israel, Chile, Columbia, Costa Rica, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, 
Haiti, Honduras, Uruguay, Jordan. 
These countries represent from 32 to 46 percent of the total U.S. grain exports 
over the years sampled. 
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Grain export volumes by country of destination have a role in the 
computation of every variable of the model. The model is the same for all three 
regime groups: 
where Xt is the volume of U.S. grain exports to countries with a particular 
exchange regime in the tth time period, a is the intercept coefficient and Ut is 
the error term for that time period (t = 1972, ... , 1986). For years 1982 to 1986, 
export volumes by country of destination were read directly from the table 
values for Grains & Feeds in the calendar year supplement to the USDA 
Foreign Agricultural Trade of the Unjted States (FATUS). Prior to 1982, the 
FATUS supplements did not report this Grains & Feeds aggregate and export 
volumes by country of destination were added for Wheat & Products, Rice, Feed 
Grains & Products and Blended Food Products. All volumes were quoted in 
metric tons (MT) except Blended Food Products prior to 1978 which were 
reported in thousands of pounds. These quantities were converted to MT units 
for the earlier years. 
The value in dollars of these exports was obtained in a similar manner 
and used in the calculation of grain price variable, P. The unit value was 
calculated for each group by adding the value of exports to all countries in the 
group and then dividing by the volume (Xt)· This unit value or price was then 
deflated by the U.S. consumer price index (CPI) from the country page of the 
IMF International Financial Statjstjcs (IFS). 
The exchange rate variable ER, as well as the group income variable Y 
are trade weighted. Each country's contribution to the group exchange rate and 
income values for a particular year were weighted according to the proportion of 
grain they bought relative to the total imported by the regime group. Thus, a 
64 
weighting multiplier of the individual country volume divided by the group's total 
volume (Xj/Xt) was applied to the individual exchange rate and income values 
before adding to get the group data for that year. 
Exchange rate information in terms of foreign currency per U.S. dollar 
was collected from the individual country pages of the IFS with line "rf" being 
preferred. Consumer price index data were also collected from individual 
country pages, line 64. In the absence of money illusion, only real exchange 
rates affect trade. For this reason, both currencies were deflated and a real 
exchange rate calculated. Since the exchange rate here is foreign currency 
divided by dollars (FCi/$), dividing both currencies by their respective CPI will 
deflate the exchange rate and yield the real exchange rate a or ER. Simplified, 
this relationship is: 
a= ER =Nominal Exchange Rate* (CPius/CPii). 
An index of the real exchange rate was then computed with 1980 as the base 
year. The CPis were also based on 1980. This index was constructed by 
dividing the real exchange rate values by the 1980 value. The real exchange 
rate index was trade weighted and added to other country indices to form the 
exchange rate data set for a regime group as described above. 
Deflated national income figures were gathered from the "GOP at 
Constant Prices" table in the front of the IFS. An income index with 1980 as the 
base year was constructed for these deflated figures. As with the exchange rate 
variable, the income index was trade weighted and added to other country 
indices to form the income data set for a regime group. 
Individual country policies which determine the exchange rate regime 
were not static over the entire fifteen year period. Consequently, the country 
make up of the three exchange regime groups was allowed to change three 
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times during the period covered by the empirical test. The first time period is 
from 1972 to 1977. The determination as to which group a country belongs 
during this period came from the classification of countries according to 
exchange regime made by the International Monetary Fund and published in 
their annual Report on Exchange Arrangements and Exchange Restrictions for 
1976. The second period is from 1978 to 1982 and classification was made on 
the basis of the 1981 report. The most recent period is 1983 to 1986 with 





The data set for the individual exchange regime groups is in Table VI. 
TABLE VI 
REGIME GROUP DATA 
X p ER y 
MANAGED REGIMES 
3116121 0.860188 139.8662 105.7086 
1757241 1.155322 159.2708 107.4366 
2615626 1.775094 149.1054 105.3045 
3174195 1.703337 139.9743 106.0678 
3166837 1.314098 136.3028 103.5070 
4386583 1.472412 124.7579 102.9983 
4793542 1.411711 100 100 
3831356 1.448779 99.32908 95.54662 
5736392 1.469247 103.4131 92.82751 
4442174 1.433203 106.4631 90.10048 
7273695 1.813446 111.9145 85.31556 
5136153 2.315275 107.6116 86.39324 
3756872 2.463170 110.7000 85.59391 
3566524 1.786634 110.3173 81.43303 
2259940 1.241385 131.8497 77.67415 
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TABLE VI (Continued) 
X p ER y 
FLOATING REGIMES 
24030552 0.873134 104.6938 126.3399 
26934168 1.024932 128.1693 120.8754 
31156846 1.212592 122.5510 114.2654 
29686471 1.248583 122.5297 109.9712 
29316451 1.203712 116.5880 107.0281 
30508557 1.572407 103.5650 102.7496 
32116006 1.565229 100 100 
28371963 1.694266 95.94637 94.75064 
25019083 1.517086 93.85551 89.14334 
20753894 1.478019 108.8488 86.77259 
19074092 1.878182 116.5845 82.29509 
16472410 2.222599 114.6132 81.30718 
17063664 2.478527 118.0687 80.65711 
20752122 1.786391 121.4297 74.81112 
16297412 1.186413 132.3414 70.33379 
PEGGED REGIMES 
3404480 0.937787 118.1820 115.9336 
3074789 1.125081 122.4817 112.5312 
3195840 1.148586 131.4707 116.6675 
2285921 1.221075 121.6253 112.4552 
2033179 1.259208 118.0751 111.4033 
4078990 1.697733 104.7364 105.5547 
4902112 1.785008 100 100 
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TABLE VI (Continued) 
X p ER y 
3018300 1.816571 103.8121 94.57023 
4328677 1.673322 102.8412 87.50185 
8756153 1.546885 101.3160 81.48656 
8076149 2.040066 109.3535 74.77563 
9059812 2.747561 111.8650 73.49075 
7608612 3.014121 109.6010 68.81817 
8772565 2.412355. 118.4526 62.90498 
7991540 1.477638 122.1810 58.80829 
The data set for the restricted model was formed by stacking the three 
data sets for the regime groups on top of one another. The data set for the 
unrestricted dummy variable equation is given in Table VII. The fifteen 
variables (including exports but excluding the intercept regressor) are ilsted five 
























TABLE VII (Continued) 
X D1 D3 p ER 
3174195 1 0 1.703337 139.9743 
3166837 1 0 1.314098 136.3028 
4386583 1 0 1.472412 124.7579 
4793542 1 0 1.411711 100 
3831356 1 0 1.448779 99.32908 
5736392 1 0 1.469247 103.4131 
4442174 1 0 1.433203 106.4631 
7273695 1 0 1.813446 111.9145 
5136153 1 0 2.315275 107.6116 
3756872 1 0 2.463170 110.7000 
3566524 1 0 1.786634 110.3173 
2259940 1 0 1.241385 131.8497 
24030552 0 0 0.873134 104.6938 
26934168 0 0 1.024932 128.1693 
31156846 0 0 1.21259 122.5510 
29686471 0 0 1.248583 122.5297 
29316451 0 0 1.203712 116.5880 
30508557 0 0 1.572407 103.5650 
32116006 0 0 1.565229 100 
28371963 0 0 1.694266 95.94637 
25019083 0 0 1.517086 93.85551 
20753894 0 0 1.478019 108.8488 
19074092 0 0 1.878182 116.5845 

























































































































TABLE VII (Continued) 
y Xt-1 P*D1 P*D3 ER*D1 
106.0678 3166837 1.703337 0 139.9743 
103.5070 4386583 1.314098 0 136.3028 
102.9983 4793542 1.472412 0 124.7579 
100 3831356 1.411711 0 100 
95.54662 5736392 1.448779 0 99.32908 
92.82751 4442174 1.469247 0 103.4131 
90.10048 7273695 1.433203 0 106.4631 
85.31556 5136153 1.813446 0 111.9145 
86.39324 3756872 2.315275 0 107.6116 
85.59391 3566524 2.463170 0 110.7000 
81.43303 2259940 1.786634 0 110.3173 
77.67415 1932360 1.241385 0 131.8497 
126.3399 26934168 0 0 0 
120.8754 31156846 0 0 0 
114.2654 29686471 0 0 0 
109.9712 29316451 0 0 0 
107.0281 30508557 0 0 0 
102.7496 32116006 0 0 0 
100 28371963 0 0 0 
94.75064 25019083 0 0 0 
89.14334 20753894 0 0 0 
86.77259 19074092 0 0 0 
82.29509 16472410 0 0 0 
81.30718 17063664 0 0 0 
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TABLE VII (Continued) 
y Xt-1 P*01 P*03 ER*01 
80.65711 20752122 0 0 0 
74.81112 16297412 0 0 0 
70.33379 14875340 0 0 0 
115.9336 3074789 0 0.937787 0 
112.5312 3195840 0 1.125081 0 
116.6675 2285921 0 1.148586 0 
112.4552 2033179 0 1.221075 0 
111.4033 ·4078990 0 1.259208 0 
105.5547 4902112 0 1.697733 0 
100 3018300 0 1.785008 0 
94.57023 4328677 0 1.816571 0 
87.50185 8756153 0 1.673322 0 
81.48656 8076149 0 1.546885 0 
74.77563 9059812 0 2.040066 0 
73.49075 7608612 0 2.747561 0 
68.81817 8772565 0 3.014121 0 
62.90498 7991540 0 2.412355 0 
58.80829 6814320 0 1.477638 0 
- - - - - - - - - - - - - -
ER*03 Y*01 Y*03 Xt-1 *01 Xt-1 *03 
0 105.7086 0 1757241 0 
0 107.4366 0 2615626 0 
0 105.3045 0 3174195 0 
0 106.0678 0 3166837 0 
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TABLE VII (Continued) 
ER*03 Y*01 Y*03 Xt-1 *01 Xt-1 *03 
0 103.5070 0 4386583 0 
0 102.9983 0 4793542 0 
0 100 0 3831356 0 
0 95.54662 0 5736392 0 
0 92.82751 0 4442174 0 
0 90.10048 0 7273695 0 
0 85.31556 0 5136153 0 
0 86.39324 0 3756872 0 
0 85.59391 0 3566524 0 
0 81.43303 0 2259940 0 
0 77.67415 0 1932360 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
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TABLE VII (Continued) 
ER*03 Y*01 Y*03 Xt-1 *01 Xt-1 *03 
0 0 0 0 0 
0 0 0 0 0 
118.1820 0 115.9336 0 3074789 
122.4817 0 112.5312 0 3195840 
131.4707 0 116.6675 0 2285921 
121.6253 0 112.4552 0 2033179 
118.0751 0 111.4033 0 4078990 
104.7364 0 105.5547 0 4902112 
100 0 100 0 3018300 
103.8121 0 94.57023 0 4328677 
102.8412 0 87.50185 0 8756153. 
101.3160 0 81.48656 0 8076149. 
109.3535 0 74.77563 0 9059812. 
111.8650 0 73.49075 0 7608612. 
109.6010 0 68.81817 0 8772565 
118.4526 0 62.90498 0 7991540 
122.1810 0 58.80829 0 6814320 
As is evident from Table VII, the dummy variables have a value of one 
only when they are associated with an observation from their particular regime. 
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When multiplied times an explanatory variable, the product produces another 
column of the regressor for the observations of that particular regime group. 
The OLS regressions were run on Micro TSP. The restricted model 
regression was produced by stacking the three data sets of Table VI and 
running the regression on all 45 observations. 
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